Evidence collected at the Iraq Inquiry

Evidence given at the Iraq Inquiry chaired by Sir John Chilcot

(in alphabetical order)

 

Hans Blix, chief of the UNMOVIC team inspector, 2000-2003


Lord Goldsmith, UK Attorney General, 2001-2007


Sir Jeremy Greenstock, British ambassador ath the UN, 1998-2003


Sir David Manning, adviser to Tony Blair for foreign policy, 2001-2003


Sir Christopher Meyer, British ambassador in the USA, 1997-2003


Jonathan Powell, chief of staff at 10 Downing Street, 1997-2007


Sir John Scarlett, Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee, 2001-2004


Clare Short, Labour MP and International development Secretary, 1997-2003


Kevin Tebbit, Permanente secretary ath the Foreign Office, 1998-2005


Lord Turnbull, Cabinet secretary, 2002-2005


Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Deputy legal adviser to the Foreign Secretary, 2001-2003


Michael Wood, Legal adviser to the Foreign Secretary, 2001-2006

 

Lord Goldsmith

 

[…] there werethree potential bases for the use of force.  Self-defence, humanitarian crisis and United Nations authority

 

My judgment was there wasn't the evidence of imminence of threatwhich would justify us in saying self-defence was a basis for force.

 

in July, that regime change was not a basis for legal – for lawful use of force. It could be that another lawful basis for force might lead to regime change. Indeed, it might be the only way to achieve it, but wanting regime change was not of itself a lawful basis for the use of force.

 

[…] I think then in the week in which the note of 7 March was given, I was then asked, "Would you now, please, produce a written advice expressing your view?" and I did, and although it contains more detail, it has the same substance as the oral advice I had given towards the end of February.

 

I'm explaining what I mean by "reasonable case", and this is -- if you like, this is the "yes, but" point.I wanted to sort of underline to the Prime Minister that I was saying that reasonable case is enough. I'm saying it is a reasonable case. So that is the green light. Indeed, I had said that, as I told the Inquiry earlier in February, but I want to underline, "Please don't misunderstand, a reasonable case doesn't mean of itself that, if this matter were to go to court, you would necessarily win".

 

 

if Saddam Hussein, for example, had gone into exile at that moment, that would of course have put a very different complexion on it, because then one would at least have said, "Why do you now need" -- because you need to have a reason for the force, "Why do you now need to use force in order to get disarmament?

 

SIR FREEDMAN: So the political circumstances could have led you in a sense to go to the Prime Minister rather urgently and say, "In the light of what has happened, just hold on a moment"?

 

GOLDSMITH: Yes, that could have happened.

 

It was becoming clear, thought it hadn't yet become definitive, that the second resolution was going to be very difficult to obtain […] I now recognise that it wasn't good enough to say, "There is a reasonable case”

 

Sir Jeremy Greenstock

 

Secretary Colin Powell, who I think was more instrumental than any other individual in persuading President Bush to come to the United Nations in August 2002, was determined to get maximum consensus in the Security Council because he believed that a multilateral approach was good for the United States interest.

 

London had a limited capacity anyway to disagree with Washington because Washington was in the lead. We had a relatively poor input into Pentagon decision-making, about which you have heard from other witnesses, and, therefore, there was a sense of frustration in London that we couldn't always persuade the Americans to do what might be our preference, because they were in charge.

 

He [Bremer] did not keep me fully briefed. He never intended to keep me fully briefed on everything he was up to.

 

Sir David Manning